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security afforded by the rules in Arnett v. Kennedy 256 and Perry v.
Sindermann. 257 Arnett v. Kennedy recognized a protected property in-
terest in public employment deriving from a statute which conditions
discharge upon cause. 25" Bishop indicates that this result may be
avoided through deference to another court's interpretation of gov-
erning law, even should that interpretation disregard the teachings of
Amen v. Kennedy. 25" Similarly, expectations of continued employment
fostered by circumstances, protected under Perry v. Sindermann, now
provide an insecure basis for a due process claim, as the Bishop
decision suggests that property interests in state employment are de-
pendent upon , state law,"" which apparently may exclude interests
implied in the surrounding circumstances.
Paul v. Davis and Bishop v. Wood indicate that the words "liberty"
and "property" in the due process clause will no longer be read ex-
pansively, as protection of asserted rights is made increasingly depen-
dent upon state law. Moreover, in an apparent departure from recent
decisions, the Court in Davis and Bishop seems to have allowed con-
cern for the state interests implicated in these cases to influence the
threshold identification of the personal interest infringed by the
state."' In previous cases, consideration of the state interest was re-
served for the weighing process which determines the degree of pro-
cedure required once a constitutionally protected interest has been
identified."' The Davis and Bishop opinions thus evidence increased
solicitude for the interests of the state to the corresponding detriment
of the personal interest at stake.
MAUREEN Fox
Securities Law—Exchange Liability Under Section 6(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler &
Co., Inc.' Plaintiff, Reuben P. Hughes, a businessman and private in-
vestor, brought suit against both Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc.
(Dempsey) a broker-dealer and member of the New York Stock Ex-
change (Exchange), and the Exchange itself, to recover losses sus-
tained when certain securities subordinated by Hughes in favor of
Dempsey were sold for the benefit of creditors upon Dempsey's
liquidation.' Hughes alleged that members of Dempsey had fraudu-
2" 4.16 U.S, 134 (1974).
237 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
23" note 190 supra.
2" See § ILA supra.
Y 1" See § IIB supra.
"'See § 111 supra.
2112 Id.
534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct, 259 (1976).
'Id. at 160. The claims against Dempsey were dismissed by the court. Id. at
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lently induced him to enter into the subordination agreement, and
that the Exchange had breached its statutory duty to enforce its rules
against Dempsey both by allowing the firm to solicit subordinated cap-
ital and by removing restrictions it had previously placed on the firm. 3
In challenging the adequacy of the actions taken by the Exchange for
the purpose of stabilizing a member firm operating in violation of Ex-
change rules, the suit raised unique questions concerning stock ex-
change liability and the appropriate scope of judicial review.
The Exchange's involvement with Dempsey began after the
company met with a series of financial difficulties culminating in its
inability to comply with Exchange rules. Dempsey was one of many
stock brokerage firms plagued by financial and operational difficulties
during the late 1960's. 4 These problems stemmed primarily from an
inability to keep pace with a vastly increased trading volumes
Dempsey's problems were further exacerbated by its particular
method of diversified accounting.° An Exchange audit in 1968 finally
revealed that Dempsey was in violation of both the Exchange's net
capital' and record keeping" rules.
175-77, and will not he discussed in this article.
3 Id. at 160.
Id. at 161.
3 Id. See notes 156.60 infra for a discussion of the industry conditions at this
time, and see SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACMCFS OF BROKERS AND DEALERS,
H.R. Doc. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1971).
" Dempsey used an internal method of branch offices reporting to regional ac-
counting centers. 534 F.2d at 162.
Id. Rule 325 of the New York Stock Exchange requires that:
fido member or member organization doing any business with
others than members or member organizations or doing a general business
with the public, except a member or member organization subject to
superivison by State or Federal banking authorities, shall permit, in the
ordinary course of business as a broker, his or its Aggregate Indebtedness
to exceed 2000 per centtun of his or its Net Capital, which Net Capital
shall be not less than $50,000 in the case of a member organization carry-
ing any accounts fqr customers and shall be not.less than $25,000 in the
case of any other member or tnember organization subject to this rule, un-
less a specific temporary exception is made by the Exchange in the case of
a particular menthcr or menther organization due to unusual circum-
stances.
The initial Net Capital of a member corporation shall be at least
120% of the Net Capital required to he maintained by this rule.
The Exchange may at any time or from time to time in the case of
the particular member or member organization prescribe greater require.
ments than those prescribed herein.
Each member or member organization shall promptly notify the Ex-
change if his or its Net Capital does not equal or exceed the minimum re-
quired by this rule.
NYSE GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 2325, at 3525 (1969).
The Net Capital rule is one of the most important Exchange rules in terms of
investor protection. J.R. Williston & Beane, lnc. v. Haack, 387 F. Stipp. 173, 179
(S.D.N.Y. 1974). It assures the financial integrity of broker-dealers by setting a ratio of
their aggregate indebtedness to their net capital. Thus broker-dealers are prevented
From operating unless they have the required cash or liquid assets available. Id.
"534 F.2d at 162. Rule 342, NYSE GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 2452.10, at 3585 (1969), and
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Pursuant to its constitution, the Exchange had the authority to
suspend Dempsey if it appeared that continued operation of the firm
while in violation of these rules endangered either the firm's creditors
or the Exchange's safety." However, as an alternative to suspension,
the Exchange "invoked a measured response against Dempsey by levy-
ing certain sanctions against its business and management."'" Specific-
ally, the Exchange prohibited the firm from advertising or adding
new representatives; placed a ceiling on the volume of weekly trading;
and demanded an infusion of new capital."
Despite the imposition of restrictions, a second Exchange audit
revealed that Dempsey was close to insolvency." This situation
prompted the first in a series of meetings between the Exchange,
Dempsey, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (Com-
mission)." As a result of the initial meeting, the Exchange placed
further restrictions on Dempsey and the Commission informed Demp-
sey that it would refuse to approve any new underwritings by the
firm.' 4
Dempsey's continued financial problems and the prophylactic
measures taken by both the Exchange and the Commission lay the
groundwork for Hughes' eventual involvement with the firm. Hughes
was approached by an officer of Dempsey with the suggestion that he
subordinate a large share of his municipal bond holdings to the
firm." At the same time, Dempsey also was negotiating with John
King, president and majority stockholder of King Resources, for an
additional subordinated loan.'" The negotiations between Dempsey
440, id. 1 2440.10, at 3781, require member broker-dealers to maintain accurate re-
cords. This insures that the financial position of the firm can quickly be ascertained.
"Article XIII, NYSE Gunn.: (CCH) 11602, at 1084 (1969). Section 2 of Article
XIII of the Exchange Constitution provides:
Whenever it shall appear to the Chairman of the Board that a
member has failed to meet his engagements, or is insolvent, or the Chair-
man of the Board has been advised by the Board of Governors or by the
Board of Directors of Stock Clearing Corporation that such member is in
such financial or operating condition that he cannot be permitted to con-
tinue in business with safety to his creditors or the Exchange, prompt
notice thereof shall be given to the Exchange. Such membêr shall thereby
become suspended from membership until he has been reinstated as pro-
vided in Section 5 of this Article ( 1 1605).
If a member-dealer does not fall under Article X111 Section 2 he may be suspended for
a rule violation under Article XIV, Section 6, id. 1 1663, at 1087, which permits the
Exchange to reduce the penalty in cases where it may impose suspension.
'" Hughes v. Detnpsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc. [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 94,133, 94,528 (C.D. Cal, 1973).
" Id. at 94,532. The Exchange also fined the firm $100,000, the president
$50,000, and a vice-president $5,000. Id.
" 534 F.2d at 162.
13 Id.
" Id. The Exchange ordered Dempsey to close 50% of its branches and it sus-
pended Dempsey's president, Jerome Tegeler, for one year. Id.
"Id. at 163.
16
 Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc. [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 94,133, at 94,530 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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and King were closely scrutinized by the Commission." Through its
independent investigation of Dempsey and other broker-dealers, the
Commission knew that "serious difficulties existed with respect to its
[Dempsey's] internal management, accounting and capital
requirements.'" Despite this knowledge, the Commission refrained
from official action, and left the Exchange free to stabilize Dempsey
through the solicitation of subordinated capital."
Having watched the King negotiations carefully, "the Commis-
sion expedited the registration of King's stock with the knowledge
that it would be used for the Dempsey subordination." 20 Upon com-
pletion of the King negotiations, the Exchange lifted its restrictions on
Dempsey. 2 ' The Commission .paralleled this action by lifting its ban
on Dempsey's umierwritings. 22 Subsequently, learning of the success-
ful completion of the King negotiations, Hughes subordinated his se-
curities to Dempsey. 23
Immediately following the completion of the King and Hughes
subordination agreements, the stock market suffered an unexpectedly
sharp and prolonged decline." This market drop, especially in the
value of the King stock, 25 which constituted the basis of Dempsey's fi-
nancial position, coincided with a general decline in trading and pro-
vided a lethal blow to Dempsey. 20 In response to Dempsey's new dif-
" Id.
'" Id. at 94,531-32.
Id. at 94,532. The district court found a "gentlemen's agreement" between the
Exchange and the Commission whereby the Exchange "would seek to order its organi-
zation in its own fashion, without 'official' pressures from the Commission." Id.
2" Id. at 94,533. The King agreement was in the form of demand notes totaling
seven million dollars to be secured by King Resources stock with a market value of ten
million dollars, held in escrow. The Commission advised the Exchange that the stock
was marketable and thus qualified as capital for Dempsey. Id. at 94,530.
" 534 F.2d at 164. See text at notes 11-14 supra for a discussion of these restric-
tions.
22 1d. at 174. Dempsey still had operational problems which were the result of an
inability of its recordkeeping to keep pace with the previous volume of business. The
Exchange believed that Dempsey's main problem had been a failure of the firm's man-
agement to organize efficient back office procedures. To remedy this problem, the Ex-
change had already suspended the firm's president, and had hired Robert Peck, an ac-
countant who had resolved similar problems at Hayden Stone, another brokerage Firm.
Brief for Appellee at 15, 70, Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc., 534 F.2d 172
(9th Cir. 1976).
:3 Hughes' agreement with Dempsey contemplated that Hughes would continue
collecting interest from his securities while receiving interest payments on the loan itself
at a rate of one half of one percent above prime rate. Had Dempsey not been liqui-
dated, Hughes would have realized $80,000. Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc.,
[1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,133, at 94,530 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
" Id. at 94,536-37. The New York Stock Exchange Index dropped approximately
25%. Id. at 94,536. The market value of the King stock declined from $23 per share in
March, 1970, to $6 in May of 1970. Id. By July of 1970 there was no market for the
King stock and it was valued at only $1.50 per share. Id. at 94,536-37. The district court
held that this market plummet, coinciding with a recession in trading, was not foresee-
able at the time of the loans. Id. at 94,537.
23 1d. at 94,536.
"Id.
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faculties, the Exchange determined that Dempsey would be unable to
meet the demands of the firm's creditors. It subsequently proceeded
to liquidate the firm."
Upon Dempsey's liquidation, Hughes brought suit against the
Exchange, contending that the Exchange had violated the affirmative
duty to enforce its own rules" pursuant to section 6(b) 25 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 (Act). 3 ° Specifically, Hughes alleged
that Dempsey's violation of the Exchange's net capital and record-
keeping rules mandated suspension of the firm, and that the
Exchange's subsequent removal of the restrictions placed on Dempsey
as an alternative to suspension 3 ' while the firm continued to be in vio-
lation of Exchange rules was a further breach of the Exchange's sec-
tion 6 duty. 32
 The district court held that the implementation of re-
strictive measures short of suspension was within the "broad" discre-
tion of the Exchange and was inherent in its self-regulatory nature. 33
Further, the court reasoned that the removal of the restrictions while
the firm continued to face financial problems was implemented as a
result of an Exchange determination both that the subordinated se-
curities might solve Dempsey's difficulties and that continued imposi-
tion of the restrictions would have been tantamount "to a termination
of Exchange support and backing ...." 34 Moreover, the court noted
" Id.
"534 F.2d at 160. For a discussion of the duty owed by an exchange under § 6
see Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944). This case is
discussed in the text at notes 82-92 infra.
" 15 U.S,C. § 78f(b) (1970). This section provides:
No registration shall be granted or remain in force unless the rules
of the exchange include provision for the expulsion, suspension, or disci-
plining of a member for conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and
equitable principles of trade, and declare that the willful violation of any
provisions of this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder shall be
considered conduct or proceeding inconsistent with just and equitable
principles of trade.
30
 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
31 See text at notes 11-14 supra for a discussion of these restrictions.
32
 Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc. [1973 Transfer Binder] Fen. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 194,133, at 94,544 (C.D. Cal. 1973). Hughes alleged several other causes of
action. The first alleged violation of § 10(h) of the Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b), of Rule 106-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1976) and of §§ 12(2) and 17 of the Se-
curities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 779, by Dempsey, and by two of its officers.
534 F.2d at 160 n.l. The second cause of action alleged a violation of § 29(h) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78cc(b), and § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 by
Dempsey, and sought recission for the violations stated in the first cause of action. 534
F.2d at 160 n.l. Third, Hughes alleged violations of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act and of Rule 10b-5 by the Exchange. Id. A fourth cause of action alleged a violation
of § I0(b), of Rule 10b-5, and of §§ 12(2) and 17 of the Securities Act of 1933 by the
Exchange. Id. Fifth, Hughes sought declaratory relief against the Exchange. Finally, he
alleged that Dempsey had violated California's Corporate Code. Id,
33 Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc. [1973 Transfer Binder] Frio. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 94,133, at 94,546 (C.D. Cal. 1973). See text at notes 64-80 infra for a dis-
cussion of self-regulation.
34 1d. at 94,546.
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that the Exchange feared that the alternative of placing Dempsey in
receivership might cause a "crisis" within the industry because of an
"inevitable, public loss of confidence." 35 Accordingly, the district court
held that the Exchange's decision to lift its restrictions, while pre-
sumptuous, was "implemented in good faith" and was therefore not
an abuse of discretion." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court and HELD: although the original imposition of restric-
tive measures was within the Exchange's discretion, their later removal
was a "clear" breach of the Exchange's section 6 duty." Hughes' right
to recovery however, was barred by the doctrine of waiver, since he
was found to have possessed both full knowledge that the restrictions
on Dempsey were lifted prior to his loan and full knowledge of the
risks that he was assuming. 35
In finding a "clear" breach of duty by the Exchange, the court
of appeals undertook to examine the "reasonableness" of Exchange
action. 3 " As such, the court appears to have predicated liability on a
standard far stricter than that traditionally employed in reviewing ac-
tion committed to agency discretion.'" The standard employed in
"committed to agency discretion"' cases merely requires an examina-
tion of the record for an abuse of discretion. The court's stricter ap-
proach thus raises crucial questions with respect to the future
parameters of exchange duty and potential liability under federal se-
curities regulation.
This article will first present the rationale employed by the court
of appeals in finding that the Exchange breached its duty. In so
doing, it will demonstrate that even though the court invoked "abuse
of discretion" language, it actually applied a much more stringent.
negligence standard heretofore employed only when an exchange had
failed to take action. The article will next analyze the statutory
framework of securities regulation with a view toward determining
the proper limits of' stock exchange discretion. The propriety of a
negligence standard as compared to an abuse of discretion standard
will then be discussed in two contexts. First, this article will examine
the scope of discretion that is necessary, on a working level, to enable
an exchange to take appropriate remedial action. Second, this article
will determine which standard of liability best serves to effectuate the
statutory scheme of self-regulation and how such a standard should
he applied to the merits of the Hughes decision. Finally, the potential
" Id. at 94,532.
"Id. at 94,546.
" 534 F.2d at 174.
58 1d. at 174-75.
"Id. at 170.
4 " An exchange, while a private body, functions in many ways like a governmen-
tal agency and when it does so it should be subject to the same standard of review. See
text at notes 122-25 infra.
41 See text at notes 55-56 infra.
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found in the 1975 Securities Act Amendments .° to resolve questions
of both stock exchange liability and the appropriate scope of review
will be analyzed.
I. THE Hughes DECISION
In examining the propriety of the Exchange's response to
Dempsey's financial problems, the court of appeals attempted to iden-
tify generally the point at which the desirable preservation of flexibil-
ity in stock exchange action becomes an unacceptable license for
"completely discretionary enforcement."'" The court emphasized both
the importance of exchange discretion in regulating the securities in-
dustry and its corollary, the necessity of a narrow scope of judicial re-
view.
As long as the Exchange takes prompt actions to investi-
gate alleged violations, and, having ascertained that viola-
tions exist, takes action reasonably designed to restore
compliance with the rules, courts should not substitute their
retrospective judgment concerning the appropriate
action."
However, the court never precisely defined the parameters of permis-
sible exchange action. The minimal "guidelines" suggested by the
court included only a rejection of a standard allowing complete discre-
tion on the part of an exchange; 45 a finding that an action taken in
good faith was insufficient to shield an exchange from liability; 48 and
a recognition of the fact that the Commission's endorsement or
nonendorsement of an exchange's actions might, on a case-by-case
basis, be a factor in determining exchange liability.
In applying this nebulous standard to the facts of Hughes,'" the
court first found that although the Exchange constitution mandates
suspension of a firm when the firm cannot guarantee its safety to its
creditors or to the Exchange, 48 the determination of whether such a
condition exists is open to discretionary interpretation. 49 Therefore,
the imposition of restrictions on Dempsey pursuant to the rule violation
was found to be a permissable exercise of Exchange authority. 50 The
court then turned to an examination of the subsequent removal of the
restrictions. It weighed the "sufficiency" of this action and found an
" Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
43 534 F.2d at 169.
" Id. at 170.
"Id. at 169.
46 Id. at 167.
" Id. at 173.
See note 9 supra for text of this section of the Exchange Constitution.
'D 534 F.2d at 173.
50 1d.
386
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abuse of discretion which subjected the Exchange to liability. 51 In
reaching this latter determination, the court, reasoned that the restric-
tions were placed on Dempsey to reduce its business to a level where
it could function properly." From this determination the court con-
cluded that "in lifting the restrictions, the Exchange invited an aggra-
vation of the very problems which had prompted the restrictions in
the first place."" Although the court apparently was "bothered" by
the Commission's concurrent removal of its underwriting ban on
Dempsey, it nevertheless concluded that the Commission's parallel ac-
tion could not be accorded conclusive weight because the Exchange's
breach of duty was so clear. 54
 Based upon this analysis the court held
that in taking this subsequent action the Exchange abused its discre-
tion and breached its section 6 duty.
While the court phrased its. holding in terms of "abuse of
discretion,"" it seemingly applied a more stringent standard in
evaluating the Exchange's decision to remove the restrictions placed
upon Dempsey. In a traditional abuse of discretion test the court's
function is simply to examine the record to see if there is some ra-
tional basis upon which the decision could have been made." Only if
there is no rational basis for a decision can the action be viewed as ar-
bitrary or capricious, necessitating a finding of abuse of discretion and
therefore a breach of duty. A reviewing court thus avoids the possibil-
ity of substituting its independent evaluation for that of the more ex-
pert body.
In finding that there was no evidence to support the Exchange's
decision to remove the restrictions,57 the Hughes court may have con-
cluded that the removal of restrictions was arbitrary, as having no
basis in the record, and was therefOre an abuse of discretion. How-
ever, a closer analysis reveals that the court predicated the Exchange's
breach of duty on a different standard altogether. While the court
found no evidentiary support for the Exchange's decision, it summar-
ily discounted the probative weight of the evidence which the Ex-
change did present. For example, the court determined that the addi-
tion of the new capital was not related to Dempsey's organizational
problems," and therefore would not serve as a rational basis for the
decision. In so doing, the court seemingly ignored the finding of the
district court that the Exchange believed that the loan might solve
"Id. at 174.
52
 Id.
53 Id.
Id. This decision gained a 2-I majority. One judge concurred in the result but
agreed with the district court that the Exchange had not abused its discretion. Id. at
178. The other judge concurred in the opinion in part but dissented from the judg-
ment because he disagreed with the court's finding of waiver. Id. at 179-85.
sfi See text at notes 82-95 infra.
56
 K. DAVIS, ArmiNisTRATIVE LAW TEx• 549-51. (3d ed. 1972).
" 534 F.2d at 174,
56
 Id.
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Dempsey's problems. 59
 It also seemed to ignore the fact that Dempsey
had instituted new leadership designed to correct the previous mis-
management. Further, although the court specifically found that the
role of the Commission could serve as a relevant factor in determin-
ing whether there was a rational basis for Exchange action, 60
 it dis-
counted the Commission's role in this case." It would seem, then, that
there was record evidence before the reviewing court which indicated
some rational basis for the Exchange's decision to lift the restrictions.
Yet, the court reasoned in finding a breach of duty, that "[e]ither the
restrictions were not a sufficient response to Dempsey's problem in
the fall of 1969, indicating a breach of duty at that time or they were
a sufficient response indicating that their subsequent removal was a
breach of duty in March of 1970."" Thus in assessing the sufficiency
of Exchange action it appears that the court did not simply decide
that there was no rational basis for the removal of restrictions. Rather
the court engaged in an independent weighing process to find a
breach of duty. In so doing the court failed to employ the "rational
basis" standard used in abuse of discretion cases and substituted its
own stricter test.
II. THE STATUTORY SCHEME
A. Statutory Language and Legislative History
Having based Exchange liability on an independent determina-
tion of the sufficiency of Exchange action under the circumstances,"
the Ninth Circuit in Hughes apparently departed from a traditional
abuse of discretion test and moved toward a standard which ap-
proached a negligence test. While a negligence standard of review has
previously been employed when an exchange has failed to take reme-
dial action" it has never been extended to measure exchange liability
when action has been taken.
The appropriateness of negligence as a standard for judicial re-
view of exchange action can best be assessed by examining the statu-
tory framework governing the securities industry with a view toward
determining what permissible range of discretion is provided therein.
The Securities .Exchange Act invests stock exchanges with direct re-
sponsibility for regulating much of the securities industry. Congress
apparently thought that the Commission would be incapable, both in
5° Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc., [1973 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 94,133, at 94,546 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
°° 534 F.2d at 171.
°' Id. at 174.
62 Id.
63
 See W. PROSSER, TIM LAW OF TORTS 148-49 (4th ed. 1971), for the proposition
that a negligence standard implies a balancing test by the court.
"See Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737
(1944). This case is discussed in the text at notes 83-95 infra.
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terms of manpower and expertise, of detailed oversight of such a vast
industry.
Stock exchanges raise essentially new problems in
Federal regulation. They do not present a static situation
susceptible to fixed standards. On the contrary, it is a
highly dynamic, everchanging picture, subject to untold
and unknown possibilities and combinations that are today
unpredictable. The thing to be avoided is the placing of this com-
plex and important mechanism in a strait jacket."
This general philosphy was carried over into the provisions which di-
rectly regulate the exchanges themselves. Section 6 of the Act sets out
the registration requirements for a securities exchange. The registra-
tion process is initiated through submission by the exchanges of their
rules, whether in the form of a constitution, by laws, or articles to the
Commission. For a registration to be granted, the Commission must
then determine that these rules are "just and adequate to insure fair
dealings and protect investors ...." e11 In order to insure investor pro-
tection, exchange rules must contain enforcement provisions. Section
6(b) of the Act mandates that an exchange provide rules for the "ex-
pulsion, suspension, or disciplining of a member for conduct ...
inconsistent with the just and equitable principles of trade . . . . "67
The language of this statutory-mandate, viewed as a standard of
conduct to which the exchanges must adhere, appears quite general.
Indeed, the degree of discretion implied in the use of the phrase "just
and equitable principles of trade" could hardly seem broader." Thus,
from the language of section 6(b) itself it can. be inferred that in
enacting this provision, Congress did not intend that violations of all
rules promulgated thereunder would serve as a basis for liability.'"
This language further indicates that those violations which are to sub-
ject an exchange to liability should be reviewed in a manner consistent
with the broad discretionary language of the statute.
Another aspect of the statutory scheme also comports with the
notion of allowing an exchange considerable discretion in complying
with its statutorily mandated standard of conduct. In order to protect
investors, Congress sought to control the securities industry through a
comprehensive scheme of self-regulation, with general governmental
65 STOCK EXCHANGE REGULATION, LE'l"FF.R FROM	 PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES To THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY WITH AN
ACCOMPANYING REPORT' RELATIVE TO S'rocK EXCHANGE REGULATIONS, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (Senate Committee Print 1934) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as ROPER
REPORT].
°° 15 U.S.C. § 78(f) (1970).
87 id. at § 7810) (emphasis added).
"" For discussion of 0 6(b) as a standard of conduct see Colonial Realty Corpora-
tion v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 1966) (Friendly, j.).
"Id.
389
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oversight by the Commission. 7 ° To this end, the Commission in its
supervisory capacity was given broad powers to regulate directly vari-
ous areas of the industry. For example, section 11 71
 provides for di-
rect regulation of floor trading. Further, section 19(a) 72 authorizes the
Commission to suspend an exchange for failure to enforce its rules,
and until amended in 1975, 73
 section 19(b) gave the Commission au-
thority to "alter or supplement" exchange rules in twelve specific
areas. 74
 In most cases, however, the Commission has deferred exercise
of these powers to exchange authority." This deference is seemingly
consistent with Congressional intent, for the apparent theory underly-
ing Congress' broad grant of powers to the Commission is that they
should be held in reserve, to be used only to the extent necessary to
fill the gaps where self-regulation proves inadequate. 7° Thus Congress
sought to leave the policing of the intricacies of the securities industry
7° H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934). See also ROPER REPORT,
supra note 65, at 5.8.
71
 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1970).
"Id. at § 78s(a).
75 See text at notes 175-77 infra.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1970). This section provided:
The Commission is further authorized, if after making appropriate
request in writing to a national securities exchange that such exchange ef-
fect on its own behalf specified changes in its rules and practices, and after
appropriate notice and opportunity for hearing, the Commission deter-
mines that such exchange has not made the changes so requested, and that
such changes are necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors
or to insure fair dealing in securities traded in upon such exchange or to
insure fair administration of such exchange, by rules or regulations or by
order to alter or supplement the rules of such exchange (insofar as neces-
sary or appropriate to effect such changes) in respect of such matters as
(1) safeguards in respect of the financial responsibility of members and
adequate provision against the evasion of financial responsibility through
the use of corporate forms or special partnerships; (2) the limitation or
prohibition of the registration or trading in any security within a specified
period after the issuance or primary distribution thereof; (3) the listing or
striking from listing of any security; (4) hours of trading; (5) the manner,
method, and place of soliciting business; (6) fictitious or numbered ac-
counts; (7) the time and method of making settlements, payments, and de-
liveries and of closing accounts; (8) the reporting of transactions on the
exchange and upon tickers maintained by or with the consent of the ex-
change, including the method of reporting short sales, stopped sales, sales
of securities of issuers in default, bankruptcy or receivership, and sales in-
volving other special circumstances; (9) the fixing of reasonable rates of
commission, interest, listing, and other charges; (10) minimum units of
trading; (11) odd-lot purchases and sales; (12) minimum deposits on mar-
gin accounts; and (13) similar matters.
75
 4 SEC, REPORT OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
698 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY],
75 See id. at 697-98. The legislative history of the Act supports the theory that
Commission power is to be held in reserve, giving the exchanges the primary role of
policing the industry through a system of self-regulation. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934). See also ROPER REPORT, supra note 65, at 5-8.
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to those most capable of performing it—namely the exchanges and
the Commission.' 7
In performing their self-regulating functions, the exchanges, al-
though private bodies, effectively have been delegated governmental
authority. 78 This delegation is appropriate because an exchange is the
only body which commands the necessary expertise to ascertain
quickly all the relevant facts and to make the critical daily evaluations
and decisions concerning rule enforcement. In order to use this au-
thority properly, an exchange cannot be subject to constant second-
guessing by a judiciary which, by its very nature, has limited contact
and expertise in this area. 79 The exchanges will only exercise the
decision-making responsibility envisioned by Congress and heretofore
encouraged by judicial deference if the exchanges are not subjected to
a standard of judicial review which inhibits exchange initiative. 8 °
B. Judicial Implication of a Remedy and Development of a
Standard of Exchange Liability
While it is recognized that exchanges need considerable latitude
in exercising their self-policing authority, investing them with too
great a degree of discretion would appear to be inconsistent with the
Congressional intent in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Although Congress manifested concern with ensuring exchanges
broad flexibility, it attempted to do so only within the framework of
the more important goal of protecting the investing public from arbi-
trary abuses by unregulated securities exchanges." Thus, while the
Act does not afford an express remedy to an investor injured by an
exchange's failure to fulfill its section 6 obligation to enforce its
rules,82 the courts have filled this gap by implying a private right of
action when an exchange has breached its section 6 duty by failing to
enforce its rules. Judge Clark, in Baird v. Franklin," laid the ground-
" But cf., Note, Exchange Liability for Net Capital Enforcement, 73 COLUM, L. REV.
1262, 1284-87 (1973) (The author would severely limit exchange discretion when a
broker-dealer is in violation of the net capital rule).
78 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 75 at 697.
" "A nongovernmental agency having responsibility to carry out public regula-
tory objectives cannot be expected to exercise the full measure of responsibility if the
Commission is looking over its shoulder and directing or second-guessing each indi-
vidual action that it takes." Id. at 703. The logic of this would appear to apply equally as
well to the courts since they arc not even charged with oversight of the securities indus-
try as is the Commission.
"° Carr v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1292, 1298 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Rich v. New York Stock Exchange, 379 F. Supp. 1122, 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
relict on other grounds, 522 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1975). See also text at notes 121-25 infra.
"i See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 349-52 (1963). See gener-
ally ROPER REPORT, supra note 65.
82 See, e.g., Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
737 (1944); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 373 F. Supp. 140, 142 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Pettit v. American Stock Exchange, 217 F. Supp. 21, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
83 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
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work for this private right of action against an exchange by basing ex-
change liability on a tort negligence theory. 84
 In Baird, the New York
Stock Exchange failed to take remedial action after obtaining knowl-
edge that a senior partner of a member firm had converted an
investor's securities." A majority of the Second Circuit acknowledged
that the Exchange owed a duty to act, but denied relief because the
investors had failed to prove that the Exchange's negligence was the
cause of their losses."
Dissenting on the issue of causation," Judge Clark, in his statu-
tory interpretation of section 6 set forth the theory on which a private
right of action subsequently has come to rest. He reasoned that to
hold an exchange to a duty to promulgate rules for "expulsion, sus-
pension, or disciplining of a member ... ," as set out in section
6(b),88 without imposing a concomitant duty of enforcement, would
render the section meaningless." Therefore, section 6(b) had to be
read in conjunction with section 6(d)," which grants a registration to
an exchange only on a determination by the Commission that ex-
change rules are "just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to pro-
tect investors ... ,"81 as implying a twofold obligation on the ex-
change both to promulgate and then to enforce its rules. 92 While this
" 4 141 F.2d at 245-46 (Clark, J., dissenting). For a general discussion of the de-
velopment of private remedies under the Act see Shipman, Two Current Questions Con-
cerning Implied Private Rights of Actions under the Exchange Act: Authority of the Administra-
tive Agency to Negate; Existence for Violation of Self-Regulatory Requirements, 17 W. Res. L.
Rev, 925, 963.1010 (1966).
"Id. at 241.
8° Id. at 239.
" Id. at 245 (Clark, J., dissenting).
"" See note 3 supra.
9
"141 F.2d at 244 (Clark, J., dissenting).
9°
 15 U.S.C. § 781(d) (1970). This section provides:
If it appears to the Commission that the exchange applying for registra-
tion is so organized as to be able to comply with the provisions of this
chapter and the rules and regulations thereunder and that the rules of the
exchange are just and adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect inves-
tors, the Commission shall cause such exchange to be registered as a na-
tional securities exchange.
" Id.
" 141 F.2d at 244 (Clark, J., dissenting). Liability in Baird was predicated on neg-
ligent violation of a statutory duty. Later cases have interpreted the § 6(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f(a)(1) (1970), language requiring the "agreement" of an exchange to comply with
the provision of the Act to create a contract between the exchange and the SEC. Thus,
under this theory, investors are granted a right of action as third party beneficiaries.
See, e.g., Arneil v. Ramsey, 414 F. Supp. 334, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Carr v. New York
Stock Exchange Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1292, 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Weinberger v. New
York Stock Exchange, 403 F. Supp. 1020, 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lank v. New York
Stock Exchange, 405 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The difference between the
two theories is relevant for statute of limitations purposes, because the period for
breach of a statutory duty is usually shorter than the one applicable to breach of con-
tract. See, e.g., Arneil v. Ramsey, 414 F. Supp. 334, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), and cases cited
therein. The court in Hughes found the duty owed to be the same under either theory.
534 F.2d at 166 n.5. It should be noted that the contract theory may no longer apply
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statutory analysis created a duty on the part of an exchange, the Baird
holding, would have limited exchange liability to instances where the
exchange had actual knowledge of a rule violation and had subse-
quently failed to act. The logic of Judge Clark's argument was so
forceful, however, that private rights of action were subsequently ex-
tended to cases where an exchange had reason to believe its rules were
being violated, and failed to act." 3 While the courts have broadly in-
terpreted the scope of the implied right under section 6, 04 until
Hughes they had limited the scope of the duty owed to the investor.
since the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 104 (1975),
eliminated the phrase "agreement" from § 6. This would not, however, have any effect
on causes of action accruing prior to the effective date of the Amendments. See Lank v.
New York Stock Exchange, 405 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 11.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other
grounds, No. 76-7243 (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 1977).
" See, e.g., Hochfclder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); Butterman v. Walston & Co., Inc., 387 F.2(1 822, 825
(7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn,
373 F.Supp. 140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Pettit v. American Stuck Exchange, 217 F.Supp.
21, 29-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
Although in Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412
(1975), arid Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court apparently has limited
the scope of implied rights of action, see generally Comment, 17 B.C. IND. & Cont. L. REv.
53 (1975), it appears unlikely that the implied right would he so restricted as to apply
only to public investors, and not to subordinated lenders such as Hughes. Barbour was a
suit brought by investors of a broker-dealer to compel the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation (SIPC) to provide relief to the investors of the financially troubled firm.
421 U.S. at 414. S1PC was the legislative response to situations such as those in Hughes.
The Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa et seq. (1970) created
procedures for an early warning system for troubled securities firms and provided for
orderly liquidation of those firms that failed. 421 U.S. at 416. SIPC maintained a fund
to meet the obligations to the customers of liquidated firms. Id. In this way, SIPA pro-
vided protection for investors somewhat in the form of insurance. The Court held that
the investors had no implied right of action under the Securities Investor Protection
Act (SIPA) which created SIPC. Id. at 425. Since SIPA did not expressly provide for a
private remedy but did authorize suits by the Commission to compel S1PC to perform
its statutory duty, the Court would not imply a private right of action. Id. at 417. In
reaching this decision the Court found S1 PA's policy, to defer possible intervention by
SIPC until the last possible instance, inconsistent with implying a private right of action.
Id. at 422. The Court distinguished SIPA from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by
finding that SIPA "contains no standards of conduct that a private action could help
enforce ...." Id. at 424. In contrast, § 6(b)'s prohibition against conduct "inconsistent
with just and equitable principles of trade," can be read as providing such a standard of
conduct for implied rights. Therefore, it is unlikely that Barbour will have any effect on
suits by subordinated lenders such as Hughes. Courts have always interpreted the scope
of protection provided by § 6 broadly enough to include all members of the investing
community, including subordinated lenders, who invest in brokerage houses, as well as
those who invest in securities. Arneil v. Ramsey, 414 F. Supp. 334, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
and Carr v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1292, 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1976),
both decided after Barbour, have recognized private rights of action by subordinated
lenders under 6. Moreover, the Hughes court did not read Barbour as mandating a re-
versal of the implied right created under § 6. 534 F.2d at 166 n.5. But see Lank v. New
York Stock Exchange, No. 76-7243 (2d Cir. Jan. 20, 1977). The Second Circuit would
not extend the private right beyond, public investors, thus excluding members of the
exchange community such as brokerage firm creditors. Id. slip op. at 1509.
" See note 93 supra and cases cited therein.
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Generally, liability attached only when the court found three factors
present. First, the exchange must have had actual knowledge or
reason to know of a rule violation; second, the exchange must have
subsequently failed to act; third, the failure to act must have been the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.95 The Hughes court, by effec-
tively extending section 6 negligence liability to positive measures
taken by an exchange to remedy a rule violation, significantly
broadened the scope of the duty owed under section 6.
III. TOWARDS AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Limitations of a Negligence Standard.
An appropriate standard for judicial review of exchange obliga-
tions under section 6 must effectuate the statutory scheme which de-
pends upon exchange initiative to regulate the industry. Accordingly,
a negligence standard as used by the Hughes court must be examined
with a view toward determining its effect on the self-regulatory
framework including exchange-Commission relations. There is a fun-
damental difference between a negligence standard which evokes a
court determination of whether an exchange had actual knowledge or
reason to know of rule violations and one which involves a determin-
ation of whether the actions taken by the exchange pursuant to a vio-
lation were adequate. The first is proper for judicial determination
because a readily defined standard is available, one which courts have
had considerable experience in dealing with, and one which requires
no special knowledge of the securities industry. In contrast, the other
approach must take into account such factors as Commission policy
and the extent of its knowledge of the facts, exchange rules and past
procedures, the interests of the firm which the action is being applied
to, its creditors and investors, and the interests of public investors.
By narrowing the scope of inquiry to specifics of the given case a
court imposing a negligence standard fails to weigh the impact that
such a standard may have on the system of self-regulation devised by
Congress. A negligence standard could well destroy the advantages
inherent in a self-regulatory system. By focusing on a single aspect of
an exchange's duty and attempting to assess the reasonableness of the
action taken, a court may not weigh other aspects of industry regula-
tion for which an exchange as the more experienced body had prop-
erly accounted. A court simply does not have sufficient knowledge of
the dynamics of the securities industry to weigh these factors properly
according to a negligence standard and should, therefore, defer to the
Commission which not only has such knowledge, but which was ex-
pressly created by Congress to oversee the industry.
Moreover, self-regulation has the advantage of having those
most expert in the industry responsible for its conduct on a daily
"See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F.2d 364, 372 (7th Cir.),
cm. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 373 F. Supp.
140, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 594
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basis."° It is psychologically more appealing to the industry to regulate
itself than to be regulated by supervisory body." More importantly,
self-regulation, by actively involving members of the industry, can
generate a moral ethic which could never be legislated."
Additionally, utilization of a negligence standard could poten-
tially interfere with the balance of exchange self-regulation and broad
Commission oversight. A scheme of self-regulation, such as Congress
created in the securities industry, clearly places an emphasis on ex-
change initiative and responsibility." To promote these qualities, self-
regulatory bodies must be given broad discretion in the enforcement
of their rules. If liability is imposed for active measures made in good
faith to remedy rule violations, there is little likelihood that an ex-
change will take the initiative imperative to self-regulation and will
promulgate new rules to meet the changing needs of the industry,
since to do so would simply create a greater potential liability for fail-
ure to enforce new rules adequately. Thus, while the imposition of a
negligence standard appears to be a judicial attempt to ensure respon-
sible action on the part of an exchange, it may well have the opposite
effect.
Finally, use of a negligence standard to impose liability on ex-
changes for actions designed to redress rule violations may well inter-
fere with the statutory scheme of self-regulation by causing a disinte-
gration of essential rapport between the Commission and the
exchanges.'" By so circumscribing exchange initiative, a negligence
test may force the Commission to play a far greater role in exchange
supervision than the Act envisioned. Thus, if the Commission
informally insists that an exchange issue new rules, as has been the
practice in the past,'°' the exchange is likely to resist if faced with a
negligence standard for liability. The Commission may be forced to
"" Putting aside for the moment questions of motivation and adequate con-
cern for the public interest, persons on the scene and familiar with the in-
tricacies of securities and markets from daily and full-time pursuit of the
business can more readily perceive and comprehend some types of prob-
lems and more promptly devise solutions than a governmental agency
which, however great its collective knowledge and skill, may be able to
concern itself only intermittently with specific problems, may become
aware of them only after the event, and often must defer decision and ac-
tion until thorough investigation or study has been completed.
SPECIAL STutiv„mprn note 75, at 694.
" Jennings, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 29 LAW & CONTENf P. PROB. 663, 678 (1964).
"" U. Self-regulation does have limitations. As illustrated in the Commission's
SPECIAL STunv, supra note 75 at 695.97, there is a tendency for self-regulators to be
complacent, and less than diligent in certain areas,
" SPECIAL S'I'UDY, supra note 75, at 702.
1 " Id. at 723.
11' 1 See generally Note, Informal Bargaining Process: An analysis ef the SEC's Regulation
of the New York Stock Exchange, 80 YALE L. J. 811, 819 (1971). The Commission has only
used its authority under § 19(b) twice to alter an exchange rule. M. at 815 n.32. It pre-
fers to use informal bargaining pressure to effectuate desired rule changes. See generally
SO YALE L.J. 811 (1971).
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use its Section 19 authority to enact rule changes directly. The Com-
mission has attempted to avoid use of these powers so as to minimize
unnecessary friction between the two bodies.'" Consequently, the
Commission has chosen to rely on quick, efficient, and informal
channels of communication.' 03 This may effectively be destroyed if
the Commission were unable to immunize an exchange's decision to
enforce rule changes which the Commission thought necessary. Thus,
a negligence test is not only inconsistent with a statutory scheme
geared toward self-regulation, but its continued use may well cause a
deterioration of Commision-exchange rapport so necessary to the
supervison of the securities industry.
B. Abuse of Discretion as a Standard of Review
Since negligence as a standard for review is not appropriate in
instances of active rule enforcement, a viable alternative must be
sought. Because the same policy considerations apply,'" an instructive
area of examination is the standard of review utilized in rule prom-
ulgation. There would appear to be little difference between an al-
leged section 6 violation for failure to enact adequate rules and one
alleging inadequate remedial rule enforcement where the Commission
has knowledge of the exchange's actions. The latter simply might be
considered an instance of bending the rules, which, in effect, is rule
promulgation to fit a particular situation.
When an injured investor has brought suit alleging that an ex-
change has breached its section 6 duty by failing to promulgate rules
or by promulgating inadequate rules, the courts have uniformly dis-
missed the claim, holding that the investor's only recourse is to request
that the Commission, pursuant to section 19(b) authority, 105 alter or
supplement exchange rules and practices.'" Thus in reviewing these
claims the courts have uniformly deferred to the judgement of the
Commission. For example, in Carr v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,'"
the court held that the duty to promulgate rules adequate to protect
investors, "falls outside the duty owed to plaintiffs."'" As in Hughes,
the plaintiffs in Carr, were investors in a brokerage firm rather than
in securities, 109 but as such would still have fallen under the broad
"2 Id. at 816.
'"' See generally 80 YALE L. J. 811 (1971).
1 °4 For a discussion of these policy considerations see text at notes 108-13 infra.
L° 5 See note 74 supra.
'"See, e.g., Carr v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1292, 1306
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Rich v. New York Stock Exchange, 379 F. Supp. 1122, 1128 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1975); Marbury Management, Inc. v.
Kohn, 373 F. Supp. 140, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Kroese v. New York Stock Exchange,
227 F. Supp. 519-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
'°7 414 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
'°e Id. at 1299.
1 " Id. at 1298.
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scope of section 6 protection if they had alleged that the exchange
failed to act upon knowledge of a rule violation."°
In light of both the Congressional purpose underlying enact-
ment of the Securities Exchange Act—investor protection—and the
courts' willingness to imply private remedies to effectuate this intent
where an exchange has failed to act,"' it seems logically inconsistent
to hold that the same duty owed to investors for rule enforcement is
not owed by an exchange for inadequate rule promulgation. Thus
while the courts speak in terms of no duty owed to an investor for in-
adequate rule promulgation it is more likely that there is a duty owed,
but there is also a presumption that this duty has not been breached.
Therefore there is no logical inconsistency if it is assumed that be-
cause section 6(d) states that the Commission may not grant a registra-
tion to an exchange unless there is a determination that "the rules of
the exchange are just and adequate to insure fair dealings and protect
investors," 12 courts have treated the granting of a registration to an
exchange as a conclusive presumption that the duty to the investor
has been met. Indeed, the courts appear willing to assume that im-
plicit in a grant of registration is a Commission determination that the
exchange has promulgated adequate rules:
pit does not follow that a rule made by the Exchange
under the regulatory eye of the SEC is open to question in
the courts. Plainly, determination of whether a rule ... is
adequate or inadequate raises issues calling for the exercise
of judgmental factors which are within the special compe-
tence of the SEC and outside the conventional experience
of judges and juries. Precisely because the SEC possesses
expert and specialized knowledge in this field, congress ex-
pressly placed the responsibility for resolution of such is-
sues under this comprehensive regulatory scheme on the
SEC, not on the courts." 3
There are numerous advantages to applying an abuse of discre-
tion standard in the review of exchange rule enforcement procedures.
First, an abuse of discretion standard more consistently serves the
statutory purposes envisioned in self-regulation than does a negli-
gence standard. Secondly, the abuse test will better serve to foster the
m See text at notes 83-95 supra.
,° Id.
" 3
 See note 90 supra.
"3
 Gunter v. Fried, 373 F. Supp. 4, 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The case dealt with
promulgation of rules governing specialists, pursuant to § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78K(b)
(1970). The same policy considerations of deference to Commission judgment in the
rule promulgation area should apply equally as well to the rule enforcement area. The
court in Hughes round that the Commission could have acted under § 19(b). 534 F.2d at
172. This determination should have led the court to conclude that the proper remedy
for alleged violations of positive rule enforcement measures lay with the Commission.
The failure of the Hughes court to defer to the Commission thus had the effect of
usurping the Commission's authority in a way that comes close to judicial ruletnaking.
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initiative necessary to self-regulation. Exchange initiative thus de-
creases the need for impetus from the Commission, by maintaining an
informal relationship between the two bodies, thereby reducing the
potential for friction implicit in a negligence test. More importantly,
an abuse test permits the judiciary the necessary latitude in reviewing
exchange action. By allowing a court to scrutinize exchange actions to
see if they are arbitrary or capricious, the court is relieved of the re-
sponsibility of trying to independently assess the reasonableness of ex-
change decisions.
Application of an abuse of discretion standard when a court is
reviewing remedial measures taken by an exchange upon knowledge
of rule violations has drawn support not only from practical policy
considerations but from precedent as well. In Rich v. New York Stock
Exchange," 4 the Exchange found a broker-dealer in violation of Rule
325. 15 After studying the problem, the Exchange proposed a merger
with another broker-dealer." 6 Upon the firm's failure and forced li-
quidation, the plaintiff-investor brought suit alleging breach of a sec-
tion 6 duty due to the Exchange's failure to enforce the rule."r In
granting summary judgment in favor of the Exchange, the Rich court
gave a broad interpretation to the legislative standard of conduct set
out in section 6(b). "The duty of the Exchange under section 6 to en-
force compliance with its rules 'so far as within its powers' must be
evaluated reasonably.... The Exchange's supervision need not be
fluoroscopic, ...."'" While "reasonably," appears to connote a neg-
ligence test, the court seemingly afforded a great deal of discretion to
Exchange judgment. It did not examine the details of the proposed
remedial action but rather based its determination solely on the fact
that Exchange action had been in accordance with successful past pro-
cedures for rescuing troubled firms.'" The court apparently reasoned
that the Exchange action was not arbitrary and was, in fact, rationally
based on Exchange policy. While not specifically enunciating it as
such, the Rich court thus appears to have applied an abuse of discre-
tion standard in assessing Exchange liability, and in so doing seems to
have avoided the necessity of attempting to weigh independently the
sufficiency of the action taken.
Further support for applying an abuse of discretion standard to
review of exchange enforcement action may be inferred from the fact
that abuse of discretion is the standard which typically has been used
by the courts when reviewing Commission action.'" When a decision
14 379 F. Supp. 1 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 153 (2d
Cir. 1975).
15 Id. at 1125. Rule '325 is the same rule which the Hughes complaint was based
on. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
" 4' 379 F. Supp. at 1124.
" 7 1d.
"Id. at 1126.
'"Id. at 1127.
"" See, e.g., Don D. Anderson & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 423 F.2d
813, 817 (10th Cir. 1970); Associated Sec. Corp. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 293
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entails the evaluation of a situation such as existed in Hughes, the
judgment of what is in the best interests of all parties, especially the
public investors, should be left to the Commission, as the body
charged with regulating the securities industry."' This is accom-
plished by limiting judicial review to a determination of whether the
action was so arbitrary, or unsupported by the facts that the Commis-
sion abused its discretion. This deference by the courts to the Com-
mission as the agency created by Congress to protect the interest of
investors is also a recognition of the Commission's greater expertise:
So long as the Court finds that the Commission, how-
ever inexpertly or imperfectly, is effectuating the intent of
the statute and that its regulations, however burdensome,
are so directed, within statutory and constitutional limits it
may not substitute its judgment for the more informed and
expert judgment of the Commission or pronounce upon its
wisdom for it has neither the technical competence nor
legal authority to do so ... . 122
While judicial deference to a governmental agency is theoreti-
cally different than deference to a private body, there are cogent
reasons for allowing an exchange virtually the same discretion in rule
interpretation and enforcement. Congress gave the exchanges the
primary role of policing the industry.'" In addition, because the
Commission itself has deferred enforcement in many areas to ex-
change self-regulation, an exchange acts in many respects as a quasi-
F.2d 738 (10th Cir. 1961). The Anderson case involved the sanctioning of a member of
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD), by the Commission. The
Commission acted after finding a violation of NASD's net capital rule. 423 F.2d at 815.
Petitioner claimed that another rule, which requires that a prima facie violation of the
net capital rule is made by showing no market for the securities (claimed by the
petitioner to qualify under the net capital rule), violates due process by creating an im-
permissable presumption. Id. at 816-17. The court found that the statutory presump-
tion created by the Commission's rule was a permissible exercise of its discretion, "if'
there is a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact pre-
sumed." Id. at 817. Associated Sec. Corp. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 293 F.2d
738, 741 (10th Cir. 1961). The Associated Securities case involved revocation of the license
of a broker-dealer for committing fraud on its customers by selling stock at a price not
reasonably related to the prevailing market price. 293 F.2d at 740. The court found
that the determination of market price of a security called For an exercise of Commis-
sion expertise. Id. at 741.
The balancing of private detriment against public harm requires the fair
arid proper exercise by the Commission of its discretionary powers. The
evaluation of facts and the exercise of judgment for the protection of in-
vestors dealing in over-the-counter securities is a function assigned by
Congress to the Commission rather than the courts and the exercise by the
Commission of its discretionary powers will not be upset by the courts ex-
cept for cogent reasons. An examination of the entire record establishes
that the revocation of the Associated registration was based on substantial
evidence and that the Commission did not abuse its discretion.
"' See id.
1 " Perlman v. Timberlake, 172 F. Supp. 246, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
15  See text at notes 75-79 supra.
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governmental body. 124 Thus, since the exchanges effectively share
with the Commission the responsibility of regulating the industry, the
deference paid to Commission expertise is similarly relevant to ex-
change expertise, and "[are courts should be reluctant to substitute
their hindsight judgment for those responsible for maintaining the in-
tegrity of the industry .... ,,125
Courts, then, have deferred to Commission judgment when its
decision has been based on expertise uniquely within the
Commission's sphere. 126
 On the other hand, when a Commission deci-
sion turns on an assessment which a court is highly capable of
determining,—such as the validity of witness testimony,—there is no
need to bow to Commission judgment.'" This procedure would serve
equally well for review of alleged section 6 violations by an exchange.
When the claim alleges that an exchange had knowledge or reason to
know of a rule violation, a court has a readily defined standard and
the finding should not necessitate any special knowledge of the se-
curities industry; however, when the alleged violation is for inade-
quate remedial action taken by an exchange pursuant to a rule viola-
tion, no readily defined standard is available to a court and a deter-
mination of liability involves an intimate knowledge of the industry
which a court is unlikely to possess. Therefore, a court in determining
liability should limit itself, as the court in Rich effectively did,' 28 to a
finding of whether the particular decision was so arbitrary that the
exchange abused its discretion.
IV. THE PROPER FORUM OF REVIEW AND THE PRESUMPTION THAT
THE EXCHANGE HAS NOT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION.
The proper forum for reviewing an allegation of negligence in
remedial action taken by an exchange pursuant to a rule violation
should be the Commission.'" Moreover, to the extent that the Com-
mission has reviewed exchange action and given its approval, a
presumption should arise that the exchange has not abused its discre-
tion. Support for both these propositions is found in the evaluation of
124 See text at notes 70-75 supra.
' 2 ' J.R. Williston & Beane, Inc. v. Haack, 387 F. Supp. 173, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
accord, Zuckerman v. Yount, 362 F. Supp. 858, 863 (N.D. III. 1973); but see Aimed v.
Ramsey, 414 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). In Aimed the court denied an Exchange mo-
tion for summary judgment For an alleged § 6 violation for failure by the Exchange to
require "knowledgeability letters." Id. at 342. The Exchange argued that these letters
were not mandatory and that the decision to require them was always made on an ad
hoc basis. Id. The court held the Exchange to a duty to make these decisions consistent,
and in a manner protective of investors. M. Thus, the court appears to have substituted
its hindsight judgment for that of the Exchange.
"6
 See text at note 122 supra.
'" Klopp v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n 427 F.2d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 1970).
' 28
 See text at notes 114-19 supra.
"u "[T]he Special Study is of the view that primary jurisdiction in this area
should reside in the Commission." SPECIAL. STUDY, supra note 75, at 701.
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Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,"" contained in the Special Study of
Securities Markets undertaken by the Commission. Silver involved two
non-Exchange members who had obtained wire service from the Ex-
change. Exchange rules permitted it to stop this service at any time.' 3 '
After seven months the Exchange discontinued service without notice
or reason.'" The Supreme Court held that the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 did not immunize the Exchange from antitrust liability in
this instance.'"
Crucial to the Court's reasoning in Silver was the inability of the
Commission to review Exchange enforcement action.' 34 The question
of exchange liability where the Commission did have authority to act,
as in Hughes, was not answered. The Hughes court distinguished the
role of the Commission in Silver from its role in the instant case. 135
The Silver court had to reconcile two conflicting bodies of law, with
the governmental regulatory agency having jurisdiction only to re-
quest rule changes, but possessing no authority to review action taken.
Hughes dealt only with the weight to be accorded Commission action:
When the exchange action at issue involves one of the
categories listed in Section 19(b), the options open to the
Commission are greater, and its action or inaction should
be accorded greater weight. Applying this approach to the
instant case, we find that Section 19(b) explicitly gives the
Commission the power to initiate rule changes involving
"safeguards in respect of the financial responsibility or
members," which is precisely the subject at issue here.'"
The court found "some indication of tacit approval from the lack of
Commission action." 37 While properly distinguishing Silver from the
case before it, the Hughes court concluded that even Commission "ap-
proval" when it also had authority to act' 38 would not immunize an
exchange from liability.'" Silver does not mandate this result as it
dealt with a situation when the Commission had no authority to act.
Moreover the decision in Rich appears to reach an opposite conclusion
from Hughes.' 4 ° Summary judgment in Rich was granted to the Ex-
change on a showing that its action was similar to that which had been
previously acknowledged by the Commission with approval."' This
13" 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
13 ' Id, at 344.
133 Id.
133 Id. at 365.
13 ' Id. at 357-58.
' 1 " 534 F.2d at 172,
'3" Id.
137 m.
''" See text at note 136 supra.
135 Id. at 174.
'4" See 379 F. Supp. at 1127.
41 Id. "Its procedure was in accordance with practices the SEC has acknowledged
to be proper and effective means of salvaging firms facing financial ruin." Id.
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reasoning supports the proposition that the proper forum for review
of exchange action is the Commission' 42 and, to the extent that the
Commission has approved exchange action, this should create a pre-
sumption that the exchange has not abused its discretion. A contrary
finding would place exchanges in an untenable position—"either to
submit themselves to a form of strict liability for the potential risks
inherent in the type of protective scheme devised to protect [a
member] or to forego equally important obligations—legal and
ethical—to other members." 143 It also would interfere with the statu-
tory scheme of exchange self-regulation with Commission oversight by
having the court place itself in the position of the reviewing forum
rather than the Commission.
This presumption should have been applied to the Commission's
actions in Hughes. The Commission's knowledge of Dempsey's finan-
cial problems was amply documented. The Exchange kept the Com-
mission informed of Dempsey's situation.'" In addition, the Commis-
sion expedited the registration of the subordinated stock with know-
ledge of its use by Dempsey.'" Finally, when the Exchange lifted its
restrictions, the Commission lifted its ban on further underwritings by
Dempsey,'" thus suggesting that it viewed Dempsey's position as via-
ble. This level of involvement by the Commission and its apparent au-
thority to take affirmative action under section 19(b)' 47 led the Hughes
court to conclude that there was "tacit aPproval" 14 s of Exchange ac-
tion by the Commission. This, in turn, seemingly should have led to
the further conclusion that this "tacit approval" created a presumption
that there was no abuse of discretion.
142
 This was also the conclusion of the SPECIAL STUDY Apra note 75, at 707:
If self-regulation is to function effectively and with due regard for
all aspects of the public interest, including the interest in vigorous self-
regulation, the forum for review of self-regulatory action should he the
agency already established as the official, expert guardian of the public in-
terest in the field of securities: i.e., the Commission. With its broad re-
sponsibility and concern for the entire area, it is in the best position to
comprehend and reconcile—in the first instance and subject to judicial
and congressional oversight of its own activities—the diverse factors and
considerations that may constitute or bear upon the total public interest in
the manifold and complex circumstances where the question may arise.
This is true of questions'of competition and all other aspects of the public
interest, as well as questions of reconcilement of private interests. For an
orderly and coherent regulatory scheme, with self•regulation playing its in-
tended role, needed governmental oversight ought to be fragmented as lit-
tle as possible. This is, indeed, one of the basic roles of a specialized
agency created to deal with a particular industry affected with a public in-
terest.
"g
 Hughes v. Dempsey-Teleger 8c Co., Inc. [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L.
REP. (CCH)1 94,133, at 94,546 (C. D. Cal. 1973).
at 94,545.
145 534 F.2d at 164.
1461d.
' 47 See text at note 136 supra.
I4g
 534 F.2d at 172.
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V. THE ABUSE OF DISCRETION STANDARD AS APPLIED TO THE
HUGHES FACTS.
While the Hughes court concluded that there was "tacit" Commis-
sion approval, the district court made an explicit finding that there
was neither Commission approval nor disapproval.'" Where there is a
finding that the Commission has neither approved nor disapproved
exchange action "officially" or "tacitly," either because it had no au-
thority to do so or because it had insufficient knowledge of exchange
actions, no presumption should be created. Therefore, the courts
should simply apply an abuse of discretion test. If the Exchange's ac-
tions in Hughes were measured by an abuse of discretion standard
without the presumption that there was an abuse, it appears that the
Exchange did not violate its section 6 duty to Hughes. The imposition
of restrictions by the Exchange reflected an obvious concern that
Dempsey was in trouble. Suspension of the firm, however, would pro-
tect neither its customers nor the other broker-dealers which the Ex-
change was obligated to protect."° With so speculative a market, the
Exchange feared that if the public learned that Dempsey had been
suspended, an investor panic would result."' The subsequent lifting
of restrictions was the Exchange's response to what it saw as a change
in Dempsey's situation. Dempsey's problems appeared to be twofold:
operational difficulties and net capital deficiency. The net capital
problem was to be cured by the subordinated loans. With receipt of
these funds, the plan to once again make Dempsey a profit-making
organization required removal of the restrictions.' 52
 Many of
Dempsey's operational problems appeared to have been solved, at
least on the surface, by the time the Exchange and the Commission
removed their restrictions. Dempsey had reduced its branches by
50%; all the accounting and operational control had been
centralized.'" Top management, which was thought to be the balance
of Dempsey's operating problems, had been replaced.'" Comparable
corrective procedures had worked for the Exchange on other
occasions.' 55
1 " Hughes v. Dempsey-Teleger & Co., Inc. [1973 Transfer Binder] Fun. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 5 94,133, at 94,541 (C.D. Cal. 1973). The district court balanced the in-
volvement of the Commission against the Exchange's control over the barameters by
which the accounting positions of the firms could be determined and the Exchange's
decision to withhold the availability of its trust fund should the Commission place
Dempsey in receivership. This latter point, the court concluded, forced the Commission
into Inaction. Id. The Ninth Circuit in Hughes discounted these factors in finding "tacit
approval." 534 F.2d at 172.
u"See Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SE:c. L. REP.
(CCH)1 94,133, at 94,544 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
"I
 Id. at 94,532.
"I
 Brief for Appellee at 72, Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc., 534 F.2d
156 (9th Cir. 1976).
"3 1d. at 70-71.
"'Id. at 70.
"3 id.
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Thus, when the restrictions were lifted it appeared that Dempsey
was fully capable of becoming once again a viable operation. The
problem lay in the fact that the Exchange, and probably the Commis-
sion as well, remained unaware of the total disarray of the book-
keeping of many of the member firms.'" There was simply a moun-
tain of paper which the firms were unable to handle properly. This
"paper crunch" highlighted a structural weakness in the securities in-
dustry which was unanticipated and which the industry was incapable
of dealing with immediately.'" Furthermore, the paperwork crises led
to inaccurate recordkeeping which resulted in large losses.'" The
combined effect of this, and a sudden market recession' 59 probably
caused the collapse of many of the thinly capitalized firms such as
Dempsey.' 50
 The Exchange, however, continued to view the crisis as a
temporary one, with the firms needing time to adjust properly.'"
This miscomprehension of the problem as simply one of adjustment
apparently was shared by the Commission when it lifted its underwrit-
ing ban on Dempsey after Dempsey complied with the net capital
rule.
The removal of restrictions on Dempsey should therefore be in-
terpreted as reflecting an Exchange determination that Dempsey's
position had changed. This conclusion is supported by Dempsey's re-
ceipt of the subordinated loans, Dempsey's operational changes, and
the Commission's lifting of the underwriting restriction. Viewed in
light of these facts and in light of the Exchange's erroneous but good
faith belief that the continued operational difficulties were merely
temporary rather than structural, the Exchange's action in lifting its
restrictions on Dempsey was not arbitrary. The adjustment period
upon which the Exchange relied was unavailable to Dempsey since the
unexpected market recession coincided with the Exchange's removal
of its restrictions.'"
In view of the fact that Dempsey's demise followed so rapidly
the market drop and that the removal of the restrictions, if negligent
at all, would probably have been. gradual in effect, the conclusion
might be drawn that Dempsey's failure was not the immediate result
of the Exchange's action. However, the finding of waiverm thus re-
lieved the Hughes court of the difficult task of finding that the
156
 SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS,
H.R. Doc, No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1971). "The back offices of many a
broker-dealer resembled a trackless forest." Id. The author would like to thank Mr.
Bailey Smith of Hoppin, Watson, Inc. for his invaluable insight into market conditions
during this period.
' 61 1d. at 28-29.
' 58 /d. at 13-14, 28-29,
' 55
 See note 24 supra.
' 5 ° SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS,
supra note 156, at 29.
16 ' Id. at 29.
162 534 F.2d at 164-65.
163 Id. at 174-75.
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Exchange's action was the proximate cause of Hughes' loss—an ele-
ment which had been required under the Baird line of cases.'" In
light of the district court's finding that the Exchange did not and was
not required to foresee the sudden and sharp decline of the stock
market, particularly in the King stock, the removal of the restrictions
may not have caused the harm. Thus, if the Hughes court had not
barred recovery on a theory of waiver, it may have been forced to bar
it for lack of proof on the issue of causation.
VI. THE 1975 AMENDMENTS
In amending the Securities Exchange Act,'" Congress has ap-
parently adopted a negligence standard with respect to exchange rule
enforcement. Section 19(g)(1) states that an exchange must comply
with its own rules "absent reasonable justification or excuse."'" Thus,
an exchange appears to be subject to liability for failure to strictly en-
force its rules and may raise as an affirmative defense, that it was not
negligent. Yet, this provision must be read in conjunction with section
19(g)(2), 167 which provides that the Commission, by rule "may relieve
any self-regulatory organization of any responsibility under this chap-
ter to enforce compliance [with its rules]." Section l9(g)(2), then, ap-
pears to be Congress' response to the dilemma which the Hughes neg-
ligence standard places an exchange in. 16" As recognized by the dis-
trict court in Hughes, a negligence standard places an exchange in the
impossible position of risking liability for the types of measures taken
in Hughes or foregoing its legal and ethical responsibilities to the firm
in trouble and the other members of the exchange community.'"
This inflexibility is not consistent with the broad discretion inherent in
self-regulation. 70 However, by allowing the Commission to relieve an
exchange of its duty to strictly enforce its rules, this section remains
"'See text at notes 93-95 supra.
' 66 Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
' 6° 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)(1) (Supp. V 1975). This section provides:
Every self-regulatory organization shall comply with the provisions
of this chapter, the rules and regulations thereunder, and its own rules,
and (subject to the provision of section 78q(d) of this title, paragraph (2)
of this subsection, and the rules thereunder) absent reasonable justification
or excuse enforce compliance ...
167 15 U.S.C. 78s(g)(2) (Supp. V 1975). This section provides:
The Commission, by rule, consistent with the public interest, the
protection of investors, and the other purposes of this chapter, may relieve
any self-regulatory organization of any responsibility under this chapter to
enforce compliance with any specified provision of this chapter or the
rules or regulations thereunder by any member of such organization or
person associated with such a member, or any class of such members or
persons associated with a member.
' 68 See S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1975), reprinted in (1975] U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 613, 744.
166 See text at note 143 supra.
175 Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., Inc., (1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH)1 94,133, at 94,546 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
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consistent with the self-regulatory goal of exchange initiative in de-
veloping and enforcing rules to meet the industry's changing needs.
The practical effect of these provisions will likely be to give the
exchange an opportunity to place the decision-making responsibility
in the lap of the Commission if an exchange wants to bend its rules to
save a member firm, as was attempted in Hughes. Apparently, if the
Commission "relieves" the exchange of its rule enforcement duty, it
will, contrary to the reasoning of the Hughes court,"' effectively im-
munize the exchange from liability. If the Commission does not "re-
lieve" the exchange then a negligence standard will be imposed. Still,
the use of this standard will not be inconsistent with the use of an
abuse of discretion standard suggested for cases arising prior to the
effective date of the amendment, where there is either a finding of
non-involvement or approval by the Commission.
The Amendments thus provide an opportunity for the Commis-
sion to appraise itself of the situation, and if it sees fit, "consistent
with the public interest," to grant relief and immunize the exchange.
Indeed, the risk inherent in the Hughes negligence standard seems to
dictate that an exchange would always seek to avail itself of this "im-
munization" opportunity. Thus, it would appear that in the future
there will always be Commission opportunity to approve proposed ex-
change "rule-bending" policies. Accordingly, a failure by the Commis-
sion to immunize the exchange should be read as a disapproval of ex-
change policy. This "disapproval" by the Commission should permit a
court to draw the inference that the exchange was negligent. If an ex-
change acts in the face of Commission disapproval and decides to
bend its rules, it has knowingly assumed the risk of liability. Thus, by
providing a mechanism for Commission approval prior to a court's
determination of liability, the Commission remains the proper forum
for review of exchange action and the statutory scheme is not dis-
rupted. Should the Commission "relieve" the exchange under section
19(g)(2), this action is reviewable in the courts under section 25.' 72
The court's standard of review here is whether in promulgating the
rule relieving the exchange of its rule enforcement responsibility the
Commission action was "arbitrary, capricious, (or] an abuse of discre-
tion ... .""3
 This is the same standard which this article has sug-
gested should apply to exchanges in cases arising out of fact situations
which occurred prior to the 1975 Amendments.
In addition to section 19(g), other amendment provisions give
the Commission increased authority to regulate directly the securities
markets. The overall purpose of the amendments is to ensure that the
Commission play a much greater role and provide leadership to the
"' 534 F.2d at 174. See discussion in text at notes 138-147 supra.
171 15 U.S.C. § My (Supp. V 1975).
"a Id. at § 78y(b).
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industry. 174 To help effectuate this purpose, sections 19(c) and 19(d)
provide direct review of exchange disciplinary action' 75
 and authority
to "abrogate, add to, and delete from ... the rules of a self-regulatory
organization ... as the Commission deems necessary ...."'" The
Commission is also given the authority to directly impose restrictions
on an exchange member such as the ones placed on Dempsey by the
Exchange.'" These provisions, by giving the Commission direct reg-
ulatory authority, decrease the initial necessity of having an exchange
make discretionary decisions. By providing for greater Commission
action, these provisions are consistent with section 19(g)'s negligence
standard. This standard deters excessive exchange action and these
provisions provide for direct Commission involvement to fill this gap.
Thus an abuse of discretion standard is no longer necessary after the
implementation of these amendments.
CONCLUSION
The willingness of the Hughes court to impose a negligence stan-
dard upon exchange action places a securities exchange in a precari-
ous position. The court's additional indication that Commission ap-
proval of exchange remedial action would not immunize an exchange
from liability further heightens this insecurity. Such a judicially im-
posed negligence standard fetters the discretion of a stock exchange
to an impermissible degree. A securities exchange must be given wide
latitude in interpreting and enforcing its own rules, if it is to fulfill its
statutory function. As a self-regulatory body, it has been given the
primary role for policing the industry. Only by allowing an exchange
broad discretionary judgment or by allowing it to seek immunization
from the Commission for crucial determinations, will it be able to take
the initiative in regulating an industry as complex as the securities
market. This is especially true when exchange actions have received
Commission approval. As the governmental body given the primary
responsibility for overseeing the entire securities industry, the courts
should defer to Commission judgment rather than risk interference
with the statutory scheme. However, when the Commission has disap-
proved of exchange action, the court may properly find the exchange
negligent. The rationale of the Hughes decision is obviously one of in-
vestor protection. Yet, by so circumscribing exchange discretion, the
court fosters rigidity in exchange action which will result in a net
harm to the investor. In practical terms, an exchange, faced with po-
tential liability, will in all probability be forced to suspend a member
firm in violation of exchange rules rather than risk using discretion in
174 S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 2, 33 (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S.
CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 613, at 615, 645.
1 " 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d) (Supp. V 1975).
1 " Id. at § 78s(c). This section replaces the 12 specific areas in which the Com-
mission could add to rules under previous § 19(b).
1 " Id. at § 78s(h)(1).
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the interpretation and enforcement of those rules to bring the firm
into compliance. In such a situation, the ultimate losers are the firm
and its investors. This surely was not the intent of Congress when it
passed the Securities Exchange Act. The passage of the 1975
Amendments appears to replace the balance between necessary ex-
change discretion and Commission responsibility which the Hughes
standard would have upset.
STEVEN L. SCH RECKI LAGER
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